ROJKA, Ľ.: Contemporary Problems of Horrendous Evil. In: Nuovo Giornale di Filosofia della Religione, 2019, p. x–xx. ISSN 2532-1676.
ROJKA, Ľ.: Creazione ex nihilo e inizio dell'universo, In: Aquinas, vol. LXI, 2018, no. 1-2, p. 131-145.
Astratto: L’inizio temporale dell’universo e la sua creazione da parte di un essere personale, immateriale ed estremamente potente era difesa negli ultimi decenni specialmente da W. L. Craig con il suo argomento kalãm della «miglior spiegazione». Nella sua difesa più recente risponde ad alcune obiezioni e approfondisce la sua argomentazione cosi da mostrare che gli sviluppi nel campo delle ricerche cosmologiche non diminuiscono la ragionevolezza della sua convinzione. S. Hawking suggerisce la teoria M come unico candidato plausibile per una teoria unificante e contesta la necessità dell’intervento iniziale di un creatore. Anche se nell’ultimo articolo modifica il suo modello, i tentativi di elaborare una teoria fisica unificata alla base della teoria quantistica devono ancora affrontare difficoltà concettuali e provare la loro veridicità. Le spiegazioni non-teistiche, per essere paragonabili al teismo dovrebbero in primo luogo postulare un punto di partenza metafisicamente necessario, una causa efficiente dell’inizio ex nihilo, proporre una spiegazione scientifica realistica e in ultima analisi fare riferimento a una teoria unificata.
Abstract: A temporal beginning of the universe and its creation by a personal, immaterial, and powerful being was defended in the last decades especially by W. L. Craig in his kalãm argument of the «best explanation». In his most recent defense, he responds to several objections and deepens his argument so that the recent developments in cosmological research do not diminish the reasonableness of his positions. S. Hawking suggests the M theory as the sole candidate for a unifying theory and does not see any need for a creator’s initial intervention. Although in his last article Hawking modified his model, all attempts to elaborate a unified physical theory based on quantum theory have to face still conceptual difficulties and prove their veracity. The non-theistic explanations, to be comparable to theism, should first postulate a metaphysically necessary starting point, an efficient cause of the beginning ex nihilo, propose a realistic scientific explanation, and should refer to a unified theory.
ROJKA, Ľ.: Contemporary Problems of Horrendous Evil. In: Nuovo Giornale di Filosofia della Religione, no. 8, 2018, p. 1–25. ISSN 2532-1676. Internetový časopis: https://www.filosofiadellareligione.it/index.php/saggi
Abstract: The argument from evil against the existence of God in the contemporary analytic philosophy of religion changed from the logical (J. L. Mackie) to the evidential argument from evil (W. L. Rowe), and recently to the problem of horrendous evil. D. Z. Phillips refutes traditional instrumentalist solutions to the previous forms of the argument and claims that the problem of horrendous evil shows their absurdity. He sees the basic problem with the concept of a personal God, which became majoritarian in the analytic philosophy of religion and which describes divine moral perfection in terms of utilitarian ethics. The Thomistic concept of God is not acceptable either because it is just an abstract concept. Phillips suggests understanding of God as love, which does not interfere in worldly affairs. He argues that this understanding is implicit in the «grammar of God» (Wittgenstein) and in the Christian religion. M. M. Adams responds to several objections raised by Phillips and proposes a better solution through the concept of God as being a morally good person. The crucial importance in her solution plays the intimacy with God and compensation of the victims of horrendous evil. Yet, her explanation is not without difficulties. D. Earl argues that Adam’s intimacy solution is not successful, and A. Gleeson explains that Adam’s solution is not coherent with her criticism of the classical solutions.
ROJKA, Ľ.: Pierre Teilhard de Chardin: emergentistické stvorenie ľudského vedomia In: Studia Aloisiana, roč. 9, 2018, č. 3, p. 21–38.
Abstract: There are various approaches to the study of human consciousness. P. Teilhard de Chardin was interested in the paleontological research of the evolution which led to the emergence of human consciousness. His goal was to find a common ground for scientific, philosophical and theological explanations. He observes a great „explosion” in the life-style of the first humans while in the rest of nature is relative stability. New developments in paleontology and new models of Darwinian evolution suggest that the „explosion” might not be that sudden or instantaneous as Teilhard thought, but rather gradual, with faster allopatric speciation of Homo under the stress of varying living conditions. A deeper analysis of the most recent explanations of the evolution reveals a great harmony (fine-tuning) in-between innumerable physical and biological components needed for the emergence and existence of human species, especially of Homo sapiens.
ROJKA, Ľ.: Nedorozumenia vzhľadom na vzťah kresťanskej filozofie a náboženstva. In: ACTA Facultatis Theologicae Universitatis Comenianae Bratislaviensis, roč. 15, 2018, č. 1, s. 2-19. Website: https://frcth.uniba.sk/acta/
Abstract: Explanation of the relationship between philosophy, Christian religion and theology is problematic. For religious faith, it is essential that it makes sense in the given culture and historical period, which is the goal of theology. Philosophy can play a number of useful functions, in which it is embedded in a religious or theological context, which raises doubts about its authenticity. Philosophical discussions have shown that Christian philosophy is not a specific Christian-philosophical system but a tradition of Christian philosophers who have developed various philosophical systems, fully respecting the methods and formal principles of authentic philosophy. The most appropriate connection of philosophy with the Christian value system appears through an uncompromising and consistent search for goodness and truth through an authentic use of philosophical means. It is necessary to exclude the logical relationship between the terms of philosophy and religion, the direct influence of Christianity on the philosopher’s thoughts, as well as the external or internal guidance of philosophical argumentation.
ROJKA, Ľ.: Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities. In: Gregorianum, vol. 99, 2018, no. 3, p. 597–613. ISSN 0017-4114
Abstract: The common perception of morally responsible behavior is that it presupposes freedom of choice and that free decisions and actions are not determined by natural events but by a person. The incompatibilism between a person’s morally significant freedom and causal determinism appears a natural position. Compatibilist exclude the requirement of alternative possibilities and often employ Frankfurt-style thought experiments to prove their theory. The compatibilist accounts defended by J. M. Fischer, M. Ravizza, and M. McKenna inserted into a broader understanding of a person elaborated by H. Frankfurt and W. Glannon reveal that a universal exclusion of the requirement of alternative possibilities based on Frankfurt-style examples is problematic and misleading. A more comprehensive account requires higher order complex theories of human will and consciousness, in which the rational and self-creative abilities are crucial. They are incompatible with natural causal determinism understood as a universal theory of reality because such determinism would exclude the emergence of and supervenience by the essential complex properties of human consciousness.
Riassunto: La percezione comune del comportamento moralmente responsabile è quella secondo cui esso presuppone la libertà di scelta, e le decisioni e le azioni libere non sono determinate da eventi naturali ma da una persona. L’incompatibilismo tra la libertà moralmente significativa di una persona e il determinismo causale sembra una posizione normale. I compatibilisti escludono il requisito delle possibilità alternative e spesso impiegano esperimenti di pensiero nello stile di Frankfurt per provare la loro teoria. I resoconti compatibilisti difesi da J. M. Fischer, M. Ravizza e M. McKenna, inseriti in una più ampia comprensione della persona elaborata da H. Frankfurt e W. Glannon, rivelano che un’esclusione universale del requisito delle possibilità alternative, sulla base degli esempi nello stile di Frankfurt, è problematica e fuorviante. Un resoconto maggiormente comprensivo richiede teorie complesse di ordine superiore della volontà e della coscienza umane, nelle quali sono decisive le abilità razionali e auto-creative. Esse sono incompatibili con un determinismo causale inteso come teoria universale perché escluderebbe l’emergenza delle e la supervenienza da parte delle proprietà complesse fondamentali della coscienza umana.
ROJKA, Ľ.: Diachronic Personal Identity. In: Studia Aloisiana, roč. 8, 2017, no. 4, p. 19-35.
Abstract: Complex biological and psychological explanations of personal identity do not grasp the essence of a person as an agent. They explain the functioning of various dispositions that are necessary for the existence of a person. Psychological explanations describe inner experiences of self-creation of a person, and an appropriate narrative account explains the essential first-person perspective of self-creation. Even though a dispositional view of human substance is problematic, it seems to be able to unify various levels of dispositions, which are involved in being the same person over time.
ROJKA, Ľ.: Hrozné zlo a jeho dopad na filozofické chápanie Boha. In: Ostium, roč. 13, č. 4 (2017), p. 1-12. ISSN 1336-6556
Abstract: The argument from evil in the contemporary analytic philosophy of religion changed from the logical problem to the evidential problem of evil, and recently to the problem of horrendous evil. D. Z. Phillips refuses instrumentalist solutions to the previous forms of the argument, because the problem of horrendous evil shows the absurdity of instrumentalist solutions, which imply a personal concept of God. The Thomistic concept of God is not acceptable either, because it is just an abstract concept. He suggests understanding of God as love, which does not interfere in worldly affairs. M. M. Adams responds to several objections raised by Phillips and proposes a better solution through the concept of being a morally good person. A critical analysis of the debate favors the concept of a personal God as it is used in the majoritarian analytical philosophy of religion.
ROJKA, Ľ.: Kresťanskí filozofi a ich filozofie. In: Radosť a nádej, vol. 20, 2017, no. 1-2, p. 11-23. (pdf text)
Abstract: Philosophy differs from Christian religion and theology because of its specific universality. Theology and Christianity are essentially intertwined with the existential (historical) context. The concept of Christian philosophy denotes Christian existential motivations together with an authentic philosophical system which has emerged from these motivations. Christian philosophy should not be confused with (fundamental) theology and apologetics which deal with Christian doctrines. Philosophy of religion and philosophical theology are philosophical disciplines. The concept of (Augustinian) Christian philosophy suggested by A. Plantinga is theological in its essence because it loses its universal character and global application.
ROJKA, Ľ.: Aristotelian Philosophy in the Spiritual Exercises. In: Gregorianum, vol. 98, 2017, no. 4, p. 785-794.
Abstract: Ignatius’s studies of Aristotle in Paris affected the way in which the book of Spiritual Exercises is written and structured. In the paper by R. García Mateo, there are four Aristotelian dichotomies worthy of thoughtful consideration. From the first dichotomy between Ignatius’s intellectual work and religious experience and from the second dichotomy between deductive reasoning and imaginary experience, the importance of the intellectual (rational) dimension of our activity follows. This intellectual dimension should be implemented in our lives with the help of imagination, but not supplanted by it. Good feelings about deductive reasoning are more import than just a reassurance. They serve a valuable function as a type of supra-rational validation of the rational process. From the third and fourth dichotomy between divine and human will, it follows that one should cultivate a proper (reasonable) type of freedom, and to the appropriate degree. In one’s decisions, one should seek both the rational justification in the light of the ultimate goal and also divine confirmation in prayer. From these four dichotomies, a special interplay between intellectual work (abstract thinking), imagination, intuitive confirmation of our decisions in prayer, and the right sort and degree of freedom come to light.
ROJKA, Ľ.: Radosť v živote kresťanského filozofa. In: Studia Aloisiana, vol. 8, 2017, no. 2, p. 5-20.
Abstract: Philosophical interest in truth and wisdom has been highly regarded in Christian religion and theology. One of the tasks of philosophy in theology has been to promote a better understanding of the historical message of Christianity (the Bible) and to present Christian faith in an intelligible and reasonable manner. Nevertheless, not all philosophies are compatible with the Christian theologies. The problem is sometimes with the philosophical and sometimes with the theological systems. In an overall philosophical and Christian overview of human life, the search for meaning and authentic happiness in human life has a crucial importance in resolving difficulties. In this effort, philosophy often helps to remove meaningless contradictions and futile theories from theologies, and Christian theology and religion propose theoretical and practical support in the existential struggles of human life, especially to the victims of various evils existing in the world. Both of them have a unifying goal: an authentic, valuable, and joyful human life of the individuals and society.
ROJKA, Ľ.: A Probabilistic Argument for the Reality of Free Personal Agency. In: Studia Neoaristotelica, vol. 14, 2017, no.1, p. 39−57.
Abstract: If the influence of libertarian free will on human behavior is real, the frequency of certain freely chosen actions will differ from the probability of their occurrences deduced from the statistical calculations and neuroscientific observations and laws. According to D. Pereboom, contemporary science does not prove its efficacy. According to P. van Inwagen, there is always a random element in free decisions, and hence the effect of the free will remains unknown. Swinburne observes that it is not correct to conclude that libertarian free will has no causal effect in the physical world. One can only conclude that these choices are not neurologically real. People sometimes choose to act on abstract principles, and they can do so on a regular and long-term basis. Consequently, human behavior can be predicted and explained in terms of personal agency and the reasons upon which the people have chosen to act. Probabilistic calculations strengthen the argument that the best way to explain and predict such rational behavior is to affirm the efficacy of the libertarian free will, which can overcome neurophysiological motivational states of the body and which guarantees a kind of long-term rational determinism.
ROJKA, Ľ.: Variácie morálnej zodpovednosti. In: Studia Theologica, vol. 18, 2016, no. 2, p. 135−154. ISSN 1212-8570
Abstract: The traditional understanding of moral responsibility (from Aristotle to Kant) includes libertarian freedom, the existence of which has been questioned since the rise of modern sciences (D. Hume, J. S. Mill). The positions of some contemporary philosophers and neuroscientists (like G. Strawson, D. Pereboom) reinforce this skepticism. Still, neuroscience as such cannot provide evidence for or against morally significant libertarian freedom, which is based on rational reasons and moral values. Although, there are problems with the explanation libertarian freedom, the reasons for abandoning the merit-based view of responsibility appear (thus far) insufficient for the change to a purely consequentialist understanding. It is rather important to deepen the traditional meaning and complement it with contemporary scientific achievements, when examining accountability in concrete situations of human life and society, and also examine possible social, legal, and theological implications of adoption of the purely consequentialist responsibility.
ROJKA, Ľ.: Swinburne's Modal Argument for Mind / Body dualism. In: Studia Neoaristotelica, 2016.
Abstract: The modal argument for the existence of a Cartesian human soul proposed by Richard Swinburne more than thirty years ago, if slightly adjusted and interpreted correctly, becomes a plausible argument for anyone who accepts modal arguments. The difficulty consists in a relatively weak justification of the second premise, of the real possibility of a disembodied existence, as a result of which the argument does not provide a real (conclusive) proof. The argument is best understood in the following terms: (1) Special divine action is excluded from the metaphysical possibilities and only the natural possibilities are considered, (2) the “conceivable” possibility of the existence of a person without a body is interpreted as a metaphysical (real) possibility, and inductive support for its reality is provided by apparent first-person-conceivability of a disembodied existence, detailed descriptions of out of body and near-death experiences, a priori trust in introspection in psychology and the cognitive sciences, and by the unity and peripheral space of consciousness, (3) statements about having a soul or being a material substance are excluded from the domain of the premises, and finally, (4) one accepts the Kripkean principle that having a body or a soul is an essential component of a person. If these conditions are met, the argument is valid, and the conclusion is made more plausible by Swinburne’s modal argument than it would be without it.
ROJKA, Ľ. - HALAMOVA, J.: Divine Justice and the Problem of Evil. In: Gregorianum, 2016, no. 3, p. - .
ROJKA, Ľ.: La causa prima del tempo e dell’universo: l’argomento di Giovanni Filopono oggi. In: CARUANA, L. (ed.): L’inizio e la fine dell’Universo : Orientamenti scientifici, filosofici, e teologici. Roma : G&B Press, 2016, p. 41−62. ISBN: 978-88-7839-335-6
ROJKA, Ľ.: Sebapotvrdenie a sebakritickosť človeka. In: Studia Aloisiana, vol. 7, 2016, no. 1, p. 21-36. ISSN 1338-0508
ROJKA, Ľ.: The Christian Concept of the Soul and Experiences of the Clinical Death. In: Radost a nadej, 1, 2015, p. 3-14. ISSN 1335-3543
Abstract: The concept of the soul and conception of the life after death (of the body) are important in every religion. In a changing cultural context, it is necessary to reevaluate often their content and intellectual merits with respect to the classical thinkers such as Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas and Descartes. The current interpretations of near-death (clinical death) experiences under the influence of neurosciences bring into our understanding of the soul/mind and afterlife new features. The problem is that scientific approaches depend on more complex philosophical positions regarding the mind/body dualism or monism, and explanations of personal identity. Nevertheless, descriptions near-death experiences cannot be simply declared erroneous or illusory only because they do not fit into a scientific theory, but they remain a touchstone of any proposed theory of human soul or mind.
ROJKA, Ľ.: Free Will Agency and Scientific Methods (Slobodné konanie a vedecké metódy skúmania). In: Studia Aloisiana, vol. 6, 2015, no. 3, s. 5-16. ISSN 1338-0508
Abstract: Experience of free decision-making is, according to D. Pereboom, illusory, because there is no evidence of a change of the probabilities predicted from the observation of the brain activity. P. van Inwagen, for similar reasons, declares free will agency unknowable. The probabilistic models used by Pereboom a van Inwagen are limited. For an evidence about the influence of free will on human life, one needs to go into the field of scientific psychology. The goal of scientific methods in psychology is similar to empirical methods, and there are four immportant elements in their research: the description of the events, prediction of the future events, explaination of the causal relations among these events, and application of the acquired knowledge to improvement of human life. These four individual steps can demonstrate objectively observable influence of the libertarian free will on human behavior.
ROJKA, Ľ.: Changes in Understanding of Moral Responsibility (Zmeny v chápaní morálnej zodpovednosti človeka). In: Viera a život, vol. 25, 2015, no. 6, p. 78-88.
ROJKA, Ľ.: Bernard Lonergan and the Reality of Human Freedom. In: Ostium, no. 2 (2014). ISSN 1336-6556
ROJKA, Ľ.: Bernard Lonergan and Contemporary Neurosciences. Viera a Život, 2014, no. 3, p. 57-64.
ROJKA, Ľ. - HALAMOVA, J.: Why God Created the World So Bad. In: Sudia Aloisiana, no. 1, 2014, p. 17-29.
Abstract: The so called problem of evil, in which the existence of physical and psychological suffering discredits that the world was created by an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good God, and disruptes the overall Christian conception of human life. The goal of the paper is to show in what way the existence of evil does not contradict the theistic conception of the world. On the contrary, evil in the world can play an important role in the development of the universe and in the ethical and moral development of humans. The most recent psychological studies show that difficult situations, with a training and thanks to empathy and support from loved ones, can be transformed into a post-traumatic growth, which consists in a discovery of new opportunities, development of new skills, courage, self-confidence, a deeper perception of the meaning of life, more valuable and more honest interpersonal relationships, and closer relationship with God.
Abstrakt: Takzvaný problém zla, v ktorom existencia fyzického a psychického utrpenia spochybňuje, že by svet bol stvorený všemohúcim, vševediacim a dokonale dobrým Bohom, narúša celkovú eticko-kresťanskú koncepciu ľudského života. Cieľom príspevku je ukázať, akým spôsobom existencia zla neprotirečí teistickej koncepcii sveta, ba naopak, zlo vo svete môže zohrávať dôležitú, ba až nezastupiteľnú úlohu v dynamickom rozvoji sveta a v autentickom rozvoji človeka. Súčasné psychologické štúdie ukazujú, že ťažké životné situácie je možné pomocou tréningu, vďaka empatii a pomoci zo strany blízkych, premeniť na posttraumatický rast, ktorý so sebou obnáša objavenie nových možností, rozvoj nových schopností, odvahu, sebadôveru, hlbšie vnímanie zmyslu života, hodnotnejšie a úprimnejšie medziľudské vzťahy, a bližší vzťah s Bohom.
ROJKA, Ľ.: Príčinný vplyv slobodnej vôle na správanie dualisticky chápaného človeka. In: D. Heller, & I. Sobotková (Eds.), Psychologické dny 2014: Fenomén svobody v kontextu psychologie a filosofie. Sborník z konference: 32. Psychologické dny, 11. - 13. září 2014, Olomouc. Praha: Českomoravská psychologická společnost. ISBN 978-80-260-9265-0 [online], 978-80-260-9266-7 [CD-ROM]
ROJKA, Ľ.: Jesuit Pedagogy, Philosophy, and Trnava University. (Jezuitská pedagogika, filozofia a Trnavská univerzita v Trnave). In: Jezuitské princípy utvárajúce univerzitné vzdelávanie. Zborník vedeckých prác. Ed: M. Lichner, K. Grendová. Vydala Trnavská univerzita, 2014, p. 97–109. ISBN 978-80-8082-802-8.
Abstract: A quick view of the Constitutions (2008, 2013) and the most recent developments of Trnava University (TVU) reveal a new interest in the Jesuit pedagogy and Christian identity of the University. University’s Long Term Objective for 2015 – 2020 emphasizes „Jesuit timeless principles of education“, among which cura personalis of each student is especially important. In the last forty years, the Society of Jesus updated the Ratio Studiorum (1599), which inspired the first Jesuits in creating the program of study and education at TVU. The most important principles of the Ratio were explained more in depth and linked to the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius. With this extension of the Ratio, the concept of Jesuit education embraced not only new ways of educating students, but a life style of students and teachers based on a Christian perspective with Ignatian understanding of the purpose of life and discernment.
Several Ignatian principles for teachers and students could shape the spirit of education and study at the nowadays TVU. One of the first principles is that the world is a God’s gift to humanity, and therefore in its essence the world is good, worth of study and contemplation. We can study the world freely with an open heart and mind, and with joy and confidence. Our search for truth is a search for God-given order in the world and for his plan with humanity. This search is important, because false theories evoke false images and false hopes, and these in turn lead to disasters and tragedies. The next principle is that in God’s creation every human being is loved by God, and therefore each student has his or her own dignity, and each student has to be treated with respect, trust, and friendship. This is important because each student has to develop a sense for his or her own dignity, specificity, and freedom.
In addition to these general principles, there are also concrete tools for Ignatian way of teaching. First, each class meeting has to have a clear goal and everything should point to that goal. Students should not be overloaded with too much information. Second, teaching should involve as many senses as possible that students can really experience what they are learning. For example, if they learn about bad political decisions, student should visit and see disastrous consequences of these decisions. Third, repetitions of the learned material should be done every day, every week, month, and every year. A more general rule is „Maximum exercises, minimum instructions“.
These are just few examples of Ignatian principles and rules for education, which lead students to a good preparation for life. Nevertheless, university should prepare students not only for this life, but also for eternal life. With this ultimate goal in mind, students will actualize fully their human potential, and it is only possible with God in their hearts.
ROJKA, Ľ. - HALAMOVA, J.: The Complexity of the Physical and Moral Evil: Philosophical and Psychological elements of the Ethical and Religious education. (Komplexnosť otázky fyzického a morálneho zla: Filozofické a psychologické prvky etickej i náboženskej výchovy.) In: Psychological and Philosophical Aspects of Morality in Education. Collection of Papers from the Conference. Banská Bystrica, 2013, p. 53-65. (Dobro a zlo, alebo o morálke. Psychologické a filozofické aspekty morálky v edukácii. Zborník príspevkov zo sympózia. Zostavil Ján Kaliský, Banská Bystrica, 2013, p. 53-65.)
Abstract: One of the discussed issues in philosophy is whether possible objective ethical principles could exist without religion. If they exist, the question is whether they must have a deeper foundation in God in order to be objective. There is a difference if the ethical principles are supported by the command of God (religion) and if they are not. One of the crucial (Christian) problems is the problem of evil. It deals with the existence of physical and psychological suffering, and the question is whether the existence of evil contradicts to the thesis that the world was created by an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good God . If there is a contradiction, then the commandments of God do not have a deeper justification and people, left alone, live in the midst of an evil and cruel world . Deeper philosophical analyses of the problem of evil conclude that the existence of evil does not contradict the theistic conception of the world . On the contrary, evil in the world plays an important role in the ethical and moral development of humans , as confirmed by the most recent research in psychology . D ifficult situations may be thanks to empathy and support from loved ones and positive interpretation of the events, transformed into a post-traumatic growth which consists in a discovery of new opportunities, development of new skills, courage, self-confidence, a deeper perception of the meaning of life, more valuable and more honest interpersonal relationships, and closer relationship with God.
ROJKA, Ľ.: Divine Knowledge and Foreknowledge in the Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. (Božie poznanie a predpoznanie vo filozofii Tomáša Akvinského.) (In: Ostium, no. 2, 2013, Internet Journal)
Abstract: C. Hughes has raised some interesting questions regarding the explanation of divine foreknowledge in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. The difficulties in understanding Aquinas originate not so much in his texts, but rather in a search for a deeper understanding of his position in the context of contemporary philosophy. Explanation of God’s knowledge and foreknowledge leads to an evaluation of the meaning of divine eternity and to a consideration of different kinds of necessities (absolute, ex suppositione) assigned to God’s omniscience. The meaning of different necessities requires a better articulation in the context of recent metaphysics, because any obscurity depreciates Thomistic position in comparison with other theistic accounts.
ROJKA, Ľ.: God and the Creation out of Nothing: The Cosmological Argument. (Boh a vznik sveta z ničoho: Náčrt obhajoby časového kozmologického argumentu pre Božie jestvovanie.) Studia Neoarstotelica, roč. 9, 2012, č. 3.
ROJKA, Ľ.: Why the Creation of God needs Evil. (Prečo Božie stvorenie potrebuje zlo) In: SPIŠIAKOVÁ, M.: Zlo v Božom stvorení : Riešenie problému zla v analytickej filozofii náboženstva. Warszawa : Rhetos, 2012, s. 7-20.
Abstract: A short synthesis of several proposed solutions of the problem of evil. Some of them are not compatible with others, and some are not acceptable. A few crucial ideas, which each solution needs to take into consideration, are explained.
ROJKA, Ľ.: Difficulties with the Concept of a Timeless Creator. (Ťažkosti s pojmom bezčasového stvoriteľa). In: Studia Aloisiana, roč. 3, 2012, č. 2, s. 51-65.
Abstract: There are two basic conceptions of God discussed in the most recent philosophical theology. (1) The classical conception of a timeless God is defended by authors like E. Stump and P. Helm. (2) R. Swinburne is one of the most famous defenders of the divine temporality. Even though there are several objections to the arguments by R. Swinburne (which are well explored in the revised book by P. Helm), the critique of the timelessness by W. Craig shows that the timeless conception does not have so much explanatory power as the temporal conception. Explanation of a timeless divine freedom, knowledge of the temporal facts, and causality is very problematic. Therefore the temporal concept of God seems more acceptable.
ROJKA, Ľ.: God the Creator and the Quantum Cosmology of Stephen Hawking. (Boh Stvoriteľ a kvantová kozmológia Stephena Hawkinga). In: Radosť a nádej, roč. 14, 2011, č. 2, s. 42-55.
Abstract: The quantum cosmology of S. Hawking, as it is presented in his popular books, is twinned with the alleged uselessness of the Creator hypothesis. A short analysis of his books A Brief History of Time and The Grand Design shows that the philosophical problems with his conception of the imaginary time, smooth beginning of the universe, and his realistic interpretation of the wave function of the universe persist through all his popular work. His model–dependent realism as it is introduced in his latest book is philosophically implausible. Hawking conception of the universe by no means excludes or makes needless a Creator. Even a deeper explanation of Q. Smith, who made some adjustments to Hawking’s theory, involves philosophical difficulties which a theistic hypothesis avoids all together.
ROJKA, Ľ.: God the Creator in the Grand Design of the Universe by Stephen Hawking. (Boh stvoriteľ v náčrte veľkolepého dizajnu vesmíru od Stephena Hawkinga.) In: Viera a život, roč. 21, 2011, č. 4, s. 23-31.
ROJKA, Ľ.: A Priori Non-Logical Necessity of the Existence of God. (Apriórna nie logická nutnosť Božieho jestvovania). In: Studia Aloisiana, roč. 2, 2011, č. 3, s. 15-20.
Abstract: There are several a priori principles implied in the traditional theistic arguments for the existence of God, such as the principle of causality or the principle of the impossibility of the infinite regress. In addition, for the a posteriori arguments, in order to succeed, some a priori knowledge of God is necessary. A priori knowledge can be conceptual (analytic) or metaphysical (synthetic). One of the a priori metaphysical constituents of the concept of God is the necessity of the existence of God. Moreland and Craig explain what the metaphysical necessity means and Rasmussen illustrates the way from the contingent reality to the necessary being. A deeper analysis proves their position to be reasonable and provides good answers to the raised objections. One of the goals of the article is to clarify the a priori and a posteriori components of our knowledge of God, and this clarification shows that metaphysical necessity is not identical with the logical necessity. Only the former one should be ascribed to God.
ROJKA, Ľ.: The Argument from the Unknowability of the Will of God in the Explanation of the Problem of Evil. (Argument neznalosti Božej vôle vo vysvetľovaní problému zla.) In: KIŠS, Igor a kolektív (eds.): Božia prozreteľnosť a zlo vo svete. (Problém teodícey). Zborník príspevkov z vedeckého medzinárodného ekumenického sympózia. Bratislava, 2011, s. 183–189.
Abstract in Slovak: Referát vychádza z problému zla v analytickej filozofickej tradícii a poukazuje na vysvetlenia existencie niektorých druhov zla, kedy sa dôvodí obmedzenosťou ľudského poznania Božích úmyslov. Veriaci predpokladá, že Boh má svoje dôvody. Pre neveriaceho božie dôvody neexistujú a opiera sa skôr o vedecké vysvetlenie kauzálnych príčin a dôsledkov. Ateistická kritika poukazuje na obmedzenia teistickej teórie, ktorá cez analógiu ponúka len čiastočné a neštandardné vysvetlenie pojmu Boha a jeho vzťahu k svetu. Ide však o kompletnejšie a zmysluplnejšie vysvetlenie sveta a zla než má k dispozícii ateista, pretože popri vedeckom vysvetlení podáva aj osobné vysvetlenie, ktoré (aj keď len čiastočne, neštandardne a s „problémom“) vysvetlí, čo veda vysvetliť nemôže. Preto sa zdá byť rozumné uprednostniť práve teistické vysvetlenie.
ROJKA, Ľ.: Quentin Smith and his defense of Atheism. (Quentin Smith a jeho obhajoba ateizmu.) In: Acta Facultatis Theologicae Universitatis Comenianae Bratislaviensis, Bratislava, roč. VII, 2010, č. 2, s. 242–264. ISSN 1335-8081
ROJKA, Ľ.: The Thomism of Bernard Lonergan. (Tomizmus Bernarda Lonergana SJ.) In : Studia Aloisiana, roč. 1, 2010, č. 1, s. 57-69, ISSN 1338-0508
ROJKA, Ľ.: Personal Integrity and B. Lonergan’s General Transcendent Knowledge. Gregorianum, vol. 90, 2009, no. 2, s. 317–334.
ROJKA, Ľ.: Human Authenticity and the Question of God in the Philosophy of Bernard Lonergan. In: Forum Philosophicum, vol. 13, 2008, no. 1, s. 31–49.
ROJKA, Ľ.: Are we Really without an Immaterial Soul? (Že by sme ozaj boli bez netelesnej duše?) 1. časť In: Viera a Život, 2007, č. 1, s. 60–66. ROJKA, Ľ.: Ako možno zdôvodniť existenciu netelesnej duše? 2. časť. In: Viera a Život, 2007, č. 2, s. 82–88.
ROJKA, Ľ.: Jesuit Style of Teaching Philosophy. (Jezuitský spôsob vyučovania filozofie.) In: Studia Aloisiana 2006. Bratislava : Dobrá kniha, 2007, s. 199–210. ISBN 978–80–7141–559–6
ROJKA, Ľ.: Ethics in the Context of the Philosophy of Bernard Lonergan. (Etika v kontexte filozofie Bernarda Lonergana SJ.) In: Studia Aloisiana 2006.Bratislava : Dobrá kniha, 2007, s. 211–220. ISBN 978-80-7141-559-6
ROJKA, Ľ.: Human Ignorance and the Problem of Evil. (Ľudská nevedomosť a problém zla.) In: Studia Aloisiana 2006. Bratislava : Dobrá kniha, 2007, s. 177–183. ISBN 978–80–7141–559–6
ROJKA, Ľ.: Emergence and the World-Explanation of Bernard Lonergan. In: Studia Aloisiana 2006. Bratislava : Dobrá kniha, 2007, s. 185–197. ISBN 978–80–7141–559–6
ROJKA, Ľ.: Scientific and other Explanations. (Vedecké a iné vysvetlenia.) In: ROJKA, Ľ. (ed.): Veda a náboženstvo. Zborník príspevkov na XI. konferencii Združenia učiteľov filozofie na teologických fakultách ČR a SR. Bratislava 27.–29. augusta 2007. Bratislava : TFTU, 2007.
ROJKA, Ľ.: Ratio studiorum a vyučovanie filozofie na jezuitských inštitúciách. In: Jezuitské školstvo včera a dnes. Ed. L. Csontos. Bratislava, 2006, s. 207–214. ISBN 80–7141–545–6
ROJKA, Ľ.: Antropologické základy [význam] etiky u Bernarda Lonergana. In: Viera a Život, 2006, č. 1, s. 76–82.
ROJKA, Ľ.: Kozmologický argument Richarda Swinburna. In: Studia Aloisiana 2005. Bratislava : Dobrá kniha, 2006, s. 255-264. ISBN 80–7141–517–0
ROJKA, Ľ: Eternity of God in the Bible. In: Studia Aloisiana. Bratislava : Dobrá kniha, 2002, s. 199–212. ISBN 80–7141–404–2
Abstract: Yahweh of the Bible is described in terms of human bodily and spiritual properties, and transcendental characteristics. The transcendental attributes, such as unknowability (God is unimaginable and unconceivable) and limitlessness, suggest interpretation of Yahweh as timeless. Some expressions, like «I am» of St. John's gospel, require timelessness. In this case, bodily and spiritual descriptions are to be taken as metaphors, which describe some partial characteristics of God. Verses about unchangeableness of his mind and foreknowledge strongly suggest perceiving God as timeless, especially if they are understood in the absolute sense. The absolute attributes, however, can be understood in a weaker sense or taken as metaphors for God's majesty, and then God is really known in terms of human spiritual characteristics. Biblical texts seem to allow both interpretations. This is because the Bible in general does not seem to give a sufficient statement about the nature of «time», «eternity» and their relation to God for a Christian philosophical-theological view. The reason seems to be the primary interest of biblical writers, which is in moral issues and not in philosophic wondering about the nature of God and time. Interpretation of Biblical eternity depends much on several philosophical considerations. A defender of the everlastingness must explain how and why God is described as transcendent, infinite and unknowable and still temporal. The task of a defender of the timelessness is more difficult. He has to explain how and why the Bible uses temporal expressions for a timeless God, and explain several philosophical presuppositions in order to make of the Biblical texts valid arguments for the timelessness. In order to show that the arguments against timelessness are not valid and in order to turn Biblical narratives into arguments for timelessness, one has to clarify at least these philosophical presuppositions: (1) How a timeless being can co-exist with temporal creature, (2) how can act in time, and (3) timelessly know events which are for us in future. Biblical arguments can be further strengthened showing that time is only an abstract entity and takes part in human way of knowing. There are other philosophical tasks, which have to be considered, namely, that God does not change from being timeless to temporal, a possible development of the key meanings in the Bible, and different definitions of time.
ROJKA, Ľ: Eternity of God in St. Thomas Aquinas. In: Studia Aloisiana. Bratislava : Dobrá kniha, 2002, s. 213-223. ISBN 80–7141–404–2
Abstract: The notion of eternity in St. Thomas derives from an understanding of the relation between time and motion, and from understanding immovability of a simple being. A simple being is timeless and it is totum simul. This being is not a temporal instant. There is non-temporal duration, activity and life in his simple being. Eternity primarily belongs to God, since he is the most immutable. Not only that, but God is his own eternity, because his existence is identical with his essence. Identification of a simple being with God was based on the immovability of God. The immovability follows from the demonstrations that God is the first act, absolutely simple and infinite in all perfections. Eternity, according to Aquinas, is also entailed by his necessity. Thus the first and third ways seem to be the most relevant to the affirmation of eternity. The second and the fourth ways demonstrate the perfection of the first unmoved mover, which also can lead to the affirmation of his eternity. The notion of life, which is usually related to movement is also applicable to God, since he is the first cause of life, and, as the most perfect being, he is identical with all his perfections; consequently, he is life.
ROJKA, Ľ: Edmund Husserl´s Analysis of Time-Consciousness. In: Studia Aliosiana. Bratislava : Dobrá kniha, 2002, s. 225-237. ISBN 80–7141–404–2
ROJKA, Ľ.: Collapse of the Moral World-View. In: Studia Aloisiana. Bratislava : Dobrá kniha, 2001, s. 241-248. ISBN 80–7141–374–7
ROJKA, Ľ.: Emergence. In: Studia Aloisiana. Bratislava : Dobrá kniha, 2001, s. 249–261. ISBN 80–7141–374–7
Abstract: Lonergan’s overall explanation of nonsystematic processes sometimes seems to be not clear and sometimes even contradictory to his generic account of emergent probability, because his empirical explanation does not clearly distinguish emergent systems from just nonlinear systems. However, new developments in science provide material for clarification of Lonergan’s explanation of nonsystematic processes and basically confirm his generic and explanatory account of emergent probability. In considerations of probability, one has to be aware that there is something (Lonergan’s „coincidental manifold") in the matters of fact that escapes human intelligence. In nonsystematic processes, we have to distinguish two aspects in coincidental manifold. On the one hand, there is a negative factual element, which is responsible for deviation of data from ideal statistical predictions. On the other hand, coincidental manifolds have potentiality for new levels of development. Systematic observations and classifications of similar cases can sometimes provide information for the statistical predictions of the emergence of new schemes of recurrence. A future new intelligibility (scheme of recurrence) is somehow potentially present in these „matters of fact". The use of statistics in the first case is clearly „a cloak of human ignorance". With a constant flow of „fresh" information and more efficient computers, we can get very close to precise predictions of linear and nonlinear occurrences of a systematic process. In the second case, however, the emergence of new properties does not occur according to a specific classical law or intelligibility. If a new scheme is going to emerge, probability calculus may provide some predictions based on the theory of strange attractors and observations of similar situations. Here statistics is not just a cloak of human ignorance but a cloak of a real gap in classical intelligibility. If we remove the probability, which is indeed only a cloak of human ignorance and resides in the relation of our knowledge to the concrete, there remains probability of emergence. This probability is real in the sense that the change of probabilities (from the probability of emergence to probability of survival) does not occur necessarily (causally or deterministically) or arbitrarily, and that there are really new properties (intelligibility) emerging in this process, which cannot be explained in terms of the old properties. The concrete linear and nonlinear (systematic) processes are deterministic in the sense that each present state is (causally) explained by the previous state.
ROJKA, Ľ – STARÍČEK, I.: Filozofia Bernarda Lonergana. In: Studia Aloisiana. Bratislava : Dobrá kniha, 2001, s. 263–272. ISBN 80–7141–374–7
ROJKA, Ľ.: The Teleological Argument: Hume´s Critique and some Contemporary Reappraisals. In: Studia Aloisiana. Bratislava : Dobrá kniha, 1999, s. 191–196. ISBN
ROJKA, Ľ: Eternity of God. In: Studia Aloisiana. Bratislava : Dobrá kniha, 1999, s. 197–203. ISBN 80–7141–270–8
ROJKA, Ľ.: Timeless omniscience and human free will. In: Studia Aloisiana. Bratislava : Dobrá kniha, 1999, s. 205-211. ISBN 80–7141–270–8
ROJKA, Ľ: Analogy, Schematism and the Existence of God. In: ACTA : Theologica Olomucensia, 1, 1999, č.1, s. 1–5, Olomouc.